We study the relationship between academic salaries and research performance. To this end, we use individual level data on the salary of all UK university professors, matched to results on the performance of academic departments from the 2014 government evaluation of research. The UK higher education sector is particularly interesting because professorial salaries are unregulated and the outcome of the official research evaluation of universities is one of their key financial and academic concerns. We first present a simple model of university pay determination, which shows that pay level and pay inequality in a department are positively related to performance. Our empirical results confirm these theoretical predictions; we also find that the pay-performance relationship is weaker for the more established and better paying universities. Our findings are also consistent with the idea that higher salaries have been used by departments to recruit academics more likely to improve their performance.
Introduction
Pay structure is a key driver of firm performance. A positive correlation between firm performance and average pay is firmly established in the literature (e.g. Nickell and Wadhwani 1990 , Nickell et al. 1994 , Hildreth and Oswald 1997 , Abowd et al. 1999 , and Lazear 2000 . Moreover, some evidence suggests that firms which also exhibit higher within-firm pay inequality achieve better performance (Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen 2008 , Edmans and Gabaix 2015 , Mueller et al. 2016 .
The pay-performance relationship holds true not just in commercial firms, but also in some organisations which lack a monetary measure of success, such as schools (Lavy 2009 ). Is the same true for universities? Do universities which pay more, and vary salaries more across their academics, perform better? A subject of often heated discussion among academics, there is surprisingly little systematic evidence on this important question. Moreover, the limited existing literature (Altbach et al. 2012 ) has focused on broad national differences in university pay rather than variation among institutions within a country.
In this paper we study the relationship between pay and performance in academic departments in UK universities. The British setting offers two key features of interest for policy makers around the globe interested in improving the working of the higher education sector. First, unlike many other European countries, salaries of UK full professors are not subject to national regulation, other than a nationally agreed minimum. Universities are free to compete over professorial pay, and anecdotal evidence suggests that they do so fiercely. Indeed the data we use exhibits large observed salary differences, with the highest paid professors in some of the elite institutions earning as much as seven times the national agreed minimum. Second, the systematic and comprehensive assessment of research provided by the official evaluation of the research carried out in all UK Universities, the Research Excellence Framework (REF), determines the government "block" research funding, the main source of research income for UK institutions. In addition, this assessment is a key concern because their REF performance enters as a component in several university league tables and therefore affects other sources of direct or indirect research income as well as student recruitment. Hence UK universities have strong incentives to recruit and retain professors whose presence may improve their REF performance, and in this paper we strive to uncover whether they set pay structures to pursue this goal.
To frame our investigation, we propose a simple theoretical set-up, where universities aim to maximise research success, which in turn determines the research funding they receive from the government. In the model, as in practice in the REF, each academic department is assessed individually, and a university's optimisation problem is how to allocate limited resources across departments so as to maximise an aggregate measure of the research success. Research is produced using elastically supplied capital and different kinds 1 of labour, to capture different attributes of the academics employed. Our model shows that the average and the standard deviation of pay are collinear, and it predicts a positive correlation between the research performance of a department and the average salary of its staff and between performance and the inequality in departmental pay.
The theoretical model is taken to a dataset comprising the pay of all full professors in a UK post in October 2013, and the performance of their department in REF 2014. The theoretical predictions of our model are given strong empirical support. In particular, we show that there is a positive relationship between professorial pay and REF performance. This finding is quite robust: it holds when we control for a range of departmental characteristics and fixed effects, in a specification with very high explanatory power. This result also holds across the whole range of academic disciplines. Interestingly, we find that the pay-performance relationship is weaker, though still statistically significant, in the most well known research intensive universities, and stronger among those established more recently.
We also find a positive relationship between professorial pay inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient of salaries within a department, and REF performance at the department level. Unlike the mean salary, this finding is strongest in the most prestigious universities, and it is statistically significant for disciplines in the sciences and engineering, but not in medicine and biology, the social sciences, and the arts and humanities.
An insight on the nature of the causal link between average professorial pay and research performance can be gleaned by analysing separately the determinants of the different quality indicators that are measured and combined into the overall REF result. As explained in detail in Section 3.1, three dimensions are considered to assess research performance: output, environment, and impact. The output score is determined by the quality of the publications of the members of the department at the census date, irrespectively of where the research was carried out. Environment and impact are instead evaluated through written submissions, and focus on activities carried out in the department over the entire time period assessed, irrespective of which institution is currently employing the researcher who contributed to them. That is, output is "transferable", impact is not. 1 We find that the positive association between salary and overall performance is in large part due to the relationship between salary and the evaluation of the "transferable" research output. We find a weaker link between average salary and the impact score. This result is consistent with universities giving more weight, when hiring or promoting academics, to a high performance in output, the "transferable" dimension, in turn suggesting that they do deliberately try to attract professors whose track record affects the REF performance.
Finally, we provide some evidence for ''insider" behaviour among the REF panel members: ceteris paribus, departments in which at least one member of staff sits on the REF peer-review evaluation panel perform better in the exercise. Interestingly, this effect is driven only by the environment and impact components of the aggregate quality measure, and is strongest in social sciences and in art and humanities, arguably the subject areas and the quality measures which require more subjective judgment by the panel members. Several papers have studied the previous incarnations of the REF. Early comprehensive analyses (e.g. Johnes et al. 1993 , Taylor 1995 , Sharp and Coleman 2005 have emphasised the role played by systematic "biases" in the panels' quality assessment, based on characteristics of the institutions (new universities vs. more established ones, institutions based in England vs. those based in other parts of the country, units of assessment that had a panel member vs. those which did not, and so on ). Controlling for the "quality" of the submission in the 1996 and 2001 assessments of the economics and econometrics departments, Clerides et al. (2011) do not find systematic evidence of "biases" in favour of specific institutions. The exception to this is membership in the panel, which has a positive and significant impact on the ranking of the department in the 1996 exercise. This is in line, as well as with this paper, with Butler and McAllister's (2009) study of the evaluation of the political science panel in the 2001 exercise. 2 A related viewpoint taken by a long established literature is the link between an individual's compensation and their research productivity.
Measuring the latter is challenging. The early work by Diamond (1986) focuses on citations as an indicator of a researcher's impact on her field of expertise, and finds that the marginal effect of an additional citation on individual income is positive. Other contributions distinguish between the number of citations, used as a proxy for "quality" and the measure of "quantity" given by the number of papers published. Most analyses study a small sample of departments (e.g. Hamermesh et al. 1982 , Moore et al. 1998 and Bratsberg et al. 2010 . In a recent paper, Hamermesh and Pfann (2012) consider instead a large group of 43 economics department at public institutions in the United States, and find a positive association between output and salaries. This holds both when output is measured by quality, proxied by citations, or by quantity, the number of papers. As far as we know, Sgroi and Oswald (2013) is the only paper which provides a solid theoretical foundation to the balance between quality and quantity. A small recent strand of this literature studies the determinants of individuals' research output in continental Europe: among these, Bosquet and Combes (2013) , Bagues (2010, 2015) and Checchi et al. (2014) in France, Spain, and Italy, respectively. The first of these shows that the characteristics of colleagues matter for research, while the last two focus on the link between research performance and the chances of promotion.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We present a simple theoretical model of resource allocation within universities in Section 2. The main features of the REF and the data used in the analysis are described in Section 3. Our results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. Additional results and more information on the UK university sector are available in the Appendices.
University Pay and Competition
We model the UK higher education sector as an industry comprising K universities, indexed by k = 1, . . . , K. They aim to maximise an aggregate measure of their research output in the n academic disciplines, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n. To do so, they allocate their endogenously determined budget to acquire the necessary inputs: capital and academic labour. We can think of the budget allocation as a two stage process. In the first stage, the centre allocates resources to the various disciplines; subsequently, the departments where each discipline is studied spend their devolved budget in order to maximise their objective function.
While a large body of literature emphasises the role played by conflicts of interest within large institutions (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) , in the case of universities, it is plausible to assume that individual academics and the heads of universities and of departments all share the same goal with regards to research, namely the maximisation of its quality. For this reason we posit a complete information setting.
The department optimisation problem
Academic departments can be thought of as producing two goods: teaching and research. The focus of our analysis is on understanding the effects of the competition induced by the REF, and so we abstract from explicitly describing the teaching production process, and focus instead on research. Any teaching constraints, such as the requirement to recruit a given number of students, are implicitly captured in the production function or in the budget constraint, and not modeled here. Research is produced using three inputs: capital and two types of labour, for example, good professors and superstar academics. Having different kinds of researchers is not only plausible, but also required to ensure that inequality could emerge in equilibrium. The restriction to two types only is convenient and immaterial, as will become evident.
The two types of labour differ in their supply and in their productivity. Specifically, we denote by w the salary of an academic of type and assume that its supply is given by 3
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The research output of university k in discipline i, k = 1, . . . , K, i = 1, . . . , n, is denoted by ρ k,i , and obeys a Cobb-Douglas technology, a simplified special case of the functions normally used in empirical analyses of universities production function (for example, for the UK, see Thanassoulis et al. (2011) ):
where K is the amount of capital, given by labs, equipment, technical personnel, and so on: this can be purchased in a competitive market at a price r. Let L be the amount of labour of type , = 1, 2. The different elasticities in the supply function of the two types of labour capture different job market opportunities, which depend on an academic's research potential. The parameter θ k characterises the overall research productivity of an institution, and varies by institution: different universities may have different productivities, and this could be due for example to different research environments and international connections. 4 β i is a parameter determining the importance of capital in a given discipline: naturally, research in some disciplines is more "capital-intensive" than in others, for example on account of factors affecting all institutions such as laboratory costs and the like. Note that β i is the only difference among disciplines: allowing labour productivity α or supply elasticity µ to vary would not change the analysis in substantial ways. In addition, both θ k and β i could vary both by institution and discipline, but keeping them fixed across one dimension each matches our empirical specification. Let us now consider a given department i. Suppose it receives a fixed budget B i from the central university. Its budget constraint is:
Thus department i in institution k chooses K, L 1 and L 2 to maximise (2) subject to (1) and (3). To simplify notation, let 4 We take θ k to be exogenously fixed: it may depend on reputation or history, and in particular, it is not affected by changes in the "quality" of other departments. Thus our analysis is based on the idea that the correlation between the quality of the various departments in a given university is not a necessary consequence of technological spillovers, but may be caused by an unobserved factor, common to all departments. A similar set-up emerges if θ is interpreted as a measure of the cost of doing research, and if the plausible assumption is made that academics are willing to trade-off a university's prestige and overall research environment for a lower salary (see De Fraja and Valbonesi (2012), or De Fraja (2016) ). If this is the case a prestigious university would find it easier to hire and retain high quality academics and hence enjoy a higher productivity. Proposition 1. The solution of the maximisation problem of department i in institution k satisfies:
and the research output is given by
Proof. The problem of department i is:
Substituting the constraints into the maximand, we can write this problem as:
Solving the first order conditions of the above gives (6). This, substituted into (3) and using definitions (4) and (5), gives the expression for the level of capital (7). The total research output (8) is also obtained by direct substitution.
Proposition 1 indicates that the amounts of both capital and labour employed by a department increase with the budget allocated to it, B i , whereas the amount of labour (capital) employed declines (increases) with the importance of capital in the production process, measured by β i . As for research output, it increases with the budget allocated to the unit, though it does not do so in proportion to the returns to scale, because labour costs increase with demand. The sign of the derivative of output with respect to the parameter β i is the same as the sign of ln 2β i B i c i r : therefore it is negative when the budget is low, but it becomes positive for a large enough budget. In other words, small departments become smaller still as capital intensity increases, whereas large ones instead increase further in size. This tallies with the anecdotal observation that capital intensive departments tends to be large. An immediate consequence of Proposition 1 is the following. Corollary 1. Academic salaries in department i in institution k are given by:
The mean salary is given byw
the standard deviation by
and the Gini coefficient by
Proof. Simply substitute (6) into (1) to obtain (9). (10)- (12) are simple calculations.
The derivative of both the mean salary (10) and of the standard deviation (11) is proportional to the derivative of the last term in each expression, which is −c > 0 when differentiating with respect to B i . This gives the testable implications that the mean salary and the dispersion of salaries within a department are collinear, and that both increase with the budget allocated to the department. Given that, ceteris paribus, a department research output increases with the budget, this determines a positive association between average salary and research output and between inequality in salary and research output.
The university maximisation problem
We now consider the university's allocation problem. We make the following assumptions regarding the objective function and the resources a university has at its disposal. Assumption 1. The objective function of university k is
That is, university k aims at maximising the total weighted output of its departments, with exogenously given weights, u i . The idea of (13), that the university's management aims at maximising overall prestige, given by a weighted average of the prestige of its activities, is conveyed by this simple formulation. It could be extended, with no conceptually important changes, by making the payoff depending on an institution's rank in each discipline, rather than the level of its output, or including an exponent for the output. The latter would capture an institution's preference for equality or inequality, according to wheter the exponent is smaller or greater than 1.
The next assumption establishes a link between research success and overall budget made available by the funding agency to university k, which is denoted byB k . While these budgets are in practice allocated each year on the basis of past success, we can think of the simultaneous set-up presented here as the steady state.
Assumption 2. The overall budget allocated by the government to university k is
The weights γ i are exogenously given, fixed by the government agency in charge of university funding. A linear formulation is a very natural starting point for the analysis. While the funding agency could adopt a different funding formula, for example by giving higher or lower weight to larger departments, as we explain in Section 3.1, the formula used in practice in the 2014 REF is linear in the performance of an institution's departments. With this formula, the government rewarded excellence by skewing the measure of performance strongly towards high quality outputs, but the sum of the funding of two departments would not be altered by their merging. Incorporating external sources of revenues, such as sponsorships, grant funding, income from patents or donations from alumni, would not alter the analytical set-up, as all these are positively related to prestige. Note furthermore that the funding weights γ i need not be proportional to the utility weights in (13), u i .
Recall definitions (4) and (5) to write university k's problem as:
s.t.:
2 . Then there exists a λ k > 0, such that the solution of university k's problem is given by:
Proof. The first order conditions for the Lagrangen of problem (15)- (16) are
Rearranging, we derive (17). For this condition to identify a maximum,
must be negative, which is the case if c i < 2, that is if β i < 1 − α 1 +α 2 2 , as assumed.
Corollary 2 implies that, in the steady state, universities with a higher θ k will be able to devote more resources to all their departments, which will also produce higher output. This holds in every discipline i, implying that there is a ranking of institutions, with some performing better in all disciplines and paying their professors more. Note also that in the special case where the ratio between u i and γ i is constant in i, that is when the relative "prestige" of any two disciplines equals their relative funding, the Lagrange multiplier disappears from the budget allocation (17). That is, in this case, and only in this case, all departments grow and shrink proportionally according to the funding granted to the university, measured by γ i .
Finally, note that to close the model, (17) is substituted into (16) to obtain λ k as a function of the β i 's and θ k , and the other parameters, which are constant across disciplines and institutions. Writing this as λ (θ k ; β β β), where β β β = (β 1 , . . . , β n ), we can determine the research output of each discipline as a function of the exogenous parameters: 5
Data
Our dataset combines public information on the submissions and results from the REF, available on the REF 2014 website, with information on the characteristics of UK professors in post in October 2013, the month of the census date for the inclusion of academic staff in the REF.
In this section we start by presenting the institutional environment of the REF, we discuss next the sample construction, and we report some summary statistics.
Research Excellence Framework (REF) Outcome Data
The REF 2014 is a government run evaluation to assess the quality of research in UK higher education institutions. 6 As well as ensuring accountability for public investment in research and producing evidence of its benefits, the assessment informs the selective allocation of the annual "block" budget for research to institutions. This funding is the so-called QR (quality related) allocation, and, unlike the funds distributed by the research councils, which pay for specific projects, universities are free to choose how to allocate them across projects, and indeed disciplines. The funding allocated on the basis of REF results is substantial. It corresponds to approximately one quarter of all taxpayer money awarded to higher education institutions. 7 The REF involves peer-review assessment by 36 subject-specific expert panels of the "reach and significance" of the research carried out by the academics submitted for assessment. The 36 panels are grouped into four "Main Panels", corresponding to very broad disciplinary areas: medicine and biology, the other sciences and engineering, the social sciences, and the arts and humanities. Universities are not obliged to submit all their departments for evaluation, nor are they compelled to submit all the academic members of each department taking part in the assessment exercise. By not doing so though they forgo part of their funding, which is based on a formula increasing in the number of academics submitted.
Panels assess academic departments in three areas: research output, environment, and impact. Output is assessed through the evaluation of scholarly work (such as books or journal articles), with each academic required to submit four different items. 8 Outputs are attributed to the academic at the institution in which they are employed on 31 October 2013, the REF census date, even when they were produced while the faculty member was employed by a different institution. The environment component is a written submission describing the achievements of the academic department, together with data on research grant income and PhD completions. Similarly, impact is assessed by considering written 'case studies', one for every eight academics submitted, accompanied by supporting evidence which shows how the research of the department has brought benefits outside of academia through, for example, influence on government policy or industry practice.
As a result of the evaluation, each academic department is assigned a numerical 'quality'
profile which describes the percentage of the department's output, environment and impact rated on a 5-point "star" scale from 4* to 0*, where 4* is defined as "Quality that is worldleading in terms of originality, significance and rigour" and 0* is "Quality that falls below the standard of nationally recognised work." 9 The profiles of the three components (output, environment and impact) are aggregated into a single quality profile, given by a weighted average of the three components, with weights 65%, 20%, and 15% for the three components. Formally, let π s i be the proportion of department (i, k)'s submission judged to be of quality s , with s = 0, 1, . . . , 4. π s i is then given by
where O s i , I s i , and E s i are the shares of department i's research output, impact and environment which has been attributed a grade s by the panel. Clearly ∑ and E s i and hence for π s i . The quality profiles (19) of individual departments are typically used to construct two indicators. The first is the grade point average, GPA, which is commonly used by the media in the public discourse to rank departments in national league tables. GPA is calculated as a weighted average of the scores, with the proportion in each category as weight: department i's GPA is calculated simply as:
The second indicator is a funding score formula, FS, which is used by the government as the basis to determine research funding allocations. This formula is intended to provide incentives towards high quality research, and so it gives high weight to 4 output, and no weight to output judged less than 3 . 10 With the above notation, and N i denoting the number of full-time equivalent researchers submitted by institution i, its yearly funding until the following evaluation exercise is given by
where Γ i is a coefficient of proportionality which is subject specific and determined every year depending on the overall public funding for universities. Do UK universities place greater emphasis on their GPA or funding scores? Institutions are not required to submit all their academics; instead they may choose whom to submit for assessment. The presence of N i in (21), but not in (20), thus creates for them an important trade-off. GPA, for its immediacy and simplicity is a good measure of prestige, and is used in many league tables. If institutions only cared about the GPA, then they should submit very few researchers, in the limit only their best ones. This however would harm their funding, which is proportional to the number of staff submitted for assessment. To account for these potentially different objectives, in our analysis we consider both measures of performance. We report funding scores in the main text and GPA in the Appendix We close this subsection by stressing the important difference between the various components of the quality indicator in generating incentives in recruitment and retention of academics. An individual department which hires a professor just before the REF census date is able to reap the rewards for that academic's research output over the previous years, even though the research was conducted at a different institution. This is not true, however, for impact, the research leading to which must have been carried out in the department (indeed, as in the example in footnote 1, the academic's previous employer can include her work as one of its case studies). Similarly, it would be hard for a department to argue that someone with a very short tenure could have had the opportunity to affect its research "environment". Put another way, the value to the institution of an academic's outputs travels with her, but the value of her contribution to the environment and especially her impact does not. This suggests that, when hiring (or responding to outside offers) prior to the REF census date, institutions should value more a researcher with a stellar publication record, even though she has no demonstrable impact outside academia, than a researcher whose less prestigious recent publications can however be shown to have influenced a certain Act of Parliament, an EU directive, or industry practice.
Sample Construction
To construct our dataset, we match individual characteristics of UK professors with information on the REF performance of the department of which they are members. The characteristics of the pay and age structure of UK departments are derived from data provided by the UK Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA). This agency collects administrative information about all individuals employed with the academic rank of full professor by a higher education institution in the UK as of October 2013. 11 HESA matches each individual to one of the 36 REF panels, and therefore we use the composition of departments determined by this match, even if there may be instances in which an individual in a given department is submitted to a different panel for assessment (for example, an economics member of staff might have been submitted to the management panel). Information about the average pay and its dispersion within a department is obtained from this data, which also reports details of the age structure of departments' professoriate: for each department, we know the fraction of professors whose age falls in each ten-year band.
The departmental characteristics are calculated excluding all professors paid a full-time equivalent of less than a threshold value of £50, 500 in 2013. 12 To reduce the possibility of identifying individuals, the sample is limited to units with more than three full-time equivalent professors, and we exclude units which were not submitted to the REF. We also omit the only department of the London Business School, which has very low reliance on government funding, and is an extreme outlier, in regards of salaries, as it pays on average more than three times the national average. Together these restrictions reduce our sample from approximately 17, 000 full-time equivalent professors to 16, 400. The final piece of information we add is the total remuneration of the universities' heads, typically known as Vice Chancellors, which is published every year in the Times Higher Education newspaper.
We partition departments into the four "Main Panels" defined by the REF exercise. We also divide them into five groups, according to their institutional characteristics. These are the most established universities, which include the original Russell group, labeled "Russell" -Oxbridge, LSE, and the authors' institution among them; the recently disbanded "1994 group", which comprised younger and smaller research-intensive universities, -York, Essex, Queen Mary among them; "New Universities" mostly created from locally controlled vocational institutions; "specialist" institutions, such as the Royal College of Arts, whose focus is exclusively on a single discipline; and the rest, mostly universities with historically less emphasis on research (such as Hull, Bradford), labeled "Others". A full listing of the groups is provided in Appendix A.
Summary Statistics
Summary data on the characteristics of the 1139 academic departments that comprise our final dataset are reported in Table 1 . The average department has approximately 14 professors (full-time equivalent), with an average pay at around £74,000. The number of professorial FTE in a department ranges from 3 to over 300: the biggest unit is a very large medical school. Average salary ranges from just above £50,000 to just below £130,000. The Gini coefficient for departmental pay is on average low at 0.08 but varies between zero (completely equal pay) to 0.36. 13 Notice that given the minimum pay constraint, the maximum theoretical value for The mean overall grade point average is 2.96 out of a theoretical maximum of 4, ranging from 1.51 to 3.78. These GPA scores translate to funding score values, given in (21), between close to 0 and over 900. Summary data is also provided for each component of the GPA quality score, showing that some departments managed to obtain top score for their research environment and research impact. A breakdown of average scores across the full quality profile is reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The distribution of average departmental salary and of REF funding scores is shown in Figure 1 . Departments are grouped according to the REF main panel which evaluated them (on the LHS panels), and by the type of their university (on the RHS panels). The top panels in Figure 1 illustrate a right-tail of high paying departments across panels and university types, with more pronounced skewness in the social sciences and specialist universities. The distributions of funding scores, shown in the bottom panels, are similar across panels, with a higher average among the medicine panel due to the typically large size of medical schools. For this reasons among others, we repeat in the online appendix the analysis excluding all the department in the "Clinical Medicine" unit of assessment. Panel D shows variation in performance across university types, suggesting a hierarchical ranking with the Russell group of universities on average the strongest performers, followed by the "1994" group, the "Others" and the "New Universities". Table 2 shows the correlation matrix across the different measures of research performance we consider in our study. Note that the correlations between the GPA score and its components are well below 1, indicating that the panels judges each component separately. Figure 2 illustrates a strong positive relationship between average salary and the departmental Gini coefficient across all main panels and university types. This is a stylised confirmation of Corollary 1, which predicted a positive relation between the mean pay and pay inequality within academic departments. Figure 3 illustrates the unconditional correlation between our main variables of interest: average departmental pay and funding score. It shows a positive average pay-performance gradient across subject areas and university types. The slopes of the fitted regression lines are similar across main panels, but less so across university types: the fitted line has a lower gradient in the Russell group universities and is steeper in the "New Universities". These differences in the pay-research performance relationship are confirmed in our econometric analysis. 
Results
In this section we present our main results. We estimate a series of econometric models taking the following general form:
where REFOutcome ik is a measure of REF success for the submission made by university k, which is of university type t, to the panel assessing disciplinary field i. In the main analysis the REF outcome is the natural log of the funding score, reflecting the set-up of the theoretical model; in the tables in the appendix it is the overall GPA. When we estimate specifications using GPA score as the dependent variable, the results deliver qualitatively very similar patterns (see Figures A4 and A5 , Tables 3, and A3 in the Appendix). AvSalary ik and GiniSalary ik are the average salary of the professoriate in department (i, k), in logs, and inequality in department (i, k), measured by the Gini coefficient. The matrix X ik contains additional controls including the total number of professorial full time equivalents (FTE), the total number of FTE members of staff submitted to the REF (both in logs), an indicator for whether the department had a member of staff serving on the corresponding REF panel, the total remuneration of the university's head (in logs), and the share of individuals in the professoriate who are respectively below 40 years of age, between 41 and 50 years of age, and between 51-60 years of age, with the professors older than 60 as the reference group. In some specifications we also include discipline (φ i ) and institution type (ψ t ) fixed effects to account respectively for unobserved common characteristics common to all departments in the same subject and to departments in similar institutions: given the large number of institutions, and the fact that many of them submitted very few departments, or even only one, we cannot include institution fixed effects. Table 3 presents our main results. Column (1) shows estimates from a parsimonious specification in which the only regressors are average salary and inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. The coefficients on both variables are positive and strongly statistically significant at the 1% level. In Column (2) we add a series of covariates to the model, which improve more than three-fold the goodness of fit of our specification. Results indicate that the size of the submission, measured by the total number of academic staff, thus including non-professors, improves the REF performance. At the same time, the additional effect of submitting professors rather than less senior staff is not significantly different from zero. Moreover, we find that having a member of staff on the corresponding REF panel has a positive and significant effect on the REF funding score. There is also a positive association between REF performance and the university head's total compensation (see Figure A6 in the Appendix for more details). With the inclusion of controls in Column (2) the magnitude of the impact of the average salary and of the Gini coeffcient decrease, while remaining statistically significant at the 1% level.
In Columns (3) and (4) we additionally include unit of assessment and institution type fixed effects. This improves the fit of the models, to over 90%. In both specifications the average wage and the measure of inequality keep a robust link with the REF performance, though their coefficient is lowered in value and inequality is less precisely estimated when we include the institution type fixed effect.
The magnitude of the effects we have uncovered is substantial. Our preferred specification, Column (4) indicates that a 10% increase in average salary is associated with a 5.7% increase in the REF funding. There is also a non negligible size effect: a 10% increase in the size of the total REF submission is associated to a 10.6% increase in REF funding: if two identical departments (with all co-variates equal to the sample size) were to merge, their aggregate REF funding would increase by 6.5%. The additional effect of a 10% increase in the number of professorial FTE employed, keeping the overall size constant, is a modest 1.1% increase in the REF funding. Having a member of the department on the evaluation panel increases instead the funding score by over 6%: arguably a non-negligible effect. Finally, age seems to matter little: while the coefficient for under 40 is significant 14 only few professors are under 40. We find very similar results when GPA score is used as the dependent variable (see Table A2 in the Appendix, which shows qualitatively very similar relationships between pay and performance).
The analysis of the fixed effect coefficients offers us an insight on systematic differences across fields that are not captured by our observables. Figure 4 displays plots of the unit of assessment fixed effects with 95% confidence intervals, taking as baseline the Economics and Econometrics panel. To get a handle on the magnitude of these effects a department in the discipline with the highest discipline fixed effect (sports science or communications and media studies) would receive approximately twice 15 the annual funding than an otherwise identical department in the discipline with the lowest estimated fixed effect (economics and econometrics). 16 The lower REF success on average of the Economics and Econometrics UK departments could be due either to a lower "quality" of the average submission in the field, or to a more "demanding" assessment of research by this panel's members, and our data are unable to shed any light on which of these alternative explanation is more likely. Using a methodology 14 The average department has 14.4 members, so replacing an over 40 professor with a younger one increases the number of under 40 professors by 6.94%. Given a coefficient of 0.276, ceteris paribus this swap increases the funding score by 1.9%. 15 In a regression of ln Y on covariates, if a dummy variable switches from 0 to 1, the percentage impact on Y is 100 (e c − 1), where c is the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable. See Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Giles (1982) for details. 16 Recall that the total funding accruing to an institutions following its departments' research quality is calculated according to (21) . Since the value of Γ i in economics and econometrics, sports science and communication and media studies is the same, their relative actual annual funding is equal to their relative funding score. A e r o n a u t i c a l E n g i n e e r i n g . . . E l e c t r i c a l E n g i n e e r i n g . . . C i v i l E n g i n e e r i n g G e n e r a l E n g i n e e r i n g 
Unit of Assessment
Note: Figure shows a plot of the estimated unit of assessment fixed effects from which measures quality as the number of citations attracted by papers published in high quality journals, Oswald (2015) argues however that the quality of UK economics is high.
Results by Subject Groups
So far our analysis has highlighted the existence of a strong, positive relationship between average professorial wage and REF performance. One important question is whether the shape of this relationship varies across fields. We tackle this question in two ways. First, we estimate the main model specification in Column (2) in Table 3 separately for sub-samples corresponding to the four main REF panels, including university type fixed effects. Then we repeat the exercise by running a series of subject specific models for each of the 36 units of assessment.
The results by main panel are reported in Table 4 . The effect of average salary is positive and statistically significant for all panels. It is considerably larger in the main panel A (medicine and biology), than in the other subject areas: all the coefficients are pairwise statistically significantly different, except the difference between main panels B and D, whose equality is weakly rejected, with p-value 0.0906. Moreover, the independent role of the inequality in wages in the overall sample appears to be driven by the disciplines in main panel B, science and engineering. The coefficients for the other main panels are smaller and imprecisely estimated. Furthermore, the effect of having a panel member uncovered in Column (2) of Table 3 is less statistically significant and smaller in value for medicine and biology than for the social sciences and the arts and humanities. Using the GPA score as the measure of research performance yields qualitatively very similar results, as we show in Table A3 in the Appendix.
The difference across main panels conceals some heterogeneity among the disciplines that make up the four groups. Figure 5 plots the coefficient estimates for the average professorial wage, with 95% confidence intervals shown in error bards, from the same model specification as in Column (2) of Table 4 , run separately by subject. Interestingly, our findings indicate that the positive and significant relationship between average professorial wage and REF performance holds for all disciplines. At the same time, some important differences in the magnitude of the effects emerge, even within each main panel. In particular, the professorial pay-performance link appear to be particularly strong in Clinical Medicine, Philosophy, Theology, Psychology and Earth Systems. It is instead much weaker in Sports Related Studies, Area Studies, English Language and Literature, and History.
A possible source of concern with the results in Figure 5 is that the determinants of the salary structure in Clinical Medicine might be different than those in other academic subjects. This is because a large proportion of the academics employed in these departments work also for, and are separately paid by, the National Health Service, and their salary structure might well be driven by different considerations. For this reason, in Table A6 we reproduce the A e r o n a u t i c a l E n g i n e e r i n g . . . E l e c t r i c a l E n g i n e e r i n g . . . C i v i l E n g i n e e r i n g G e n e r a l E n g i n e e r i n g 
Unit of Assessment
Note: Figure shows regression coefficient values and 95% confidence intervals (shown by vertical whisker bars) for coeffiecient estimates on average pay variable in OLS regression of funding score against average pay and controls (control variables as in Table 3 , Column 3). Separate regressions estimated for each unit of assessment sample.
same results as in Column (4) of Table 3 in the sample that excludes all the departments submitted to the Clinical Medicine unit of assessment. The results are unaffected.
Results by University Types
As suggested by Panel (D) of Figure 1 , the average REF performance differs across university types, with Russell group universities ahead of the other groups. To what extent is this result affected by the shape of the pay-performance relationship? To answer this question, in Table  5 we run the same specification as in Column (3) of Table 3 on four different subgroups of institutions: the "Russell group", the "1994 group", the "New Universities" and the "Others" (we omit specialist universities as they represent a total of only eight departments). We find that the relationship between average professorial wage and REF performance becomes progressively stronger as we move from the "Russell group" institutions to the "New univeristies", roughly following the quality of research, as depicted in Figure 3 , Panel (B) . 17 This result holds true also when we exclude from our analysis Cambridge and Oxford, two institutions that offer substantial non-monetary compensation to many senior academics, for example in the form subsidised accommodation. See Table A6 in the Appendix. The same patterns continue to hold also when we replace funding score with the GPA score as the dependent variable. These results are available in Table A3 in the appendix.
Results by Score Components
As we have pointed out in Section 3.1, the overall research profile of a unit is obtained as a weighted average of the profiles in each of the three components of outputs, environment, and impact. Importantly, while output can easily be transferred across departments by hiring the faculty member who has produced it, this is not true for the case of environment and impact. Thus we expect that if universities use higher salaries to improve their REF performance, the effect of wages should be stronger on output than on the other components of overall funding score. To assess this implication, in Table 6 we present the results of four empirical models, where the dependent variables are overall REF funding score and its components, using the specification from Column 4 of Table 3 which, as we pool all the data in these models, includes unit and institution type fixed effects. We also show results for components of the GPA score in Figure A5 .
Column (1) is the same as Column (4) in Table 3 . From the figures reported in Columns (2) - (4) we can see that the overall positive association between average salary and REF performance is driven primarily by the relationships between salary and output and between salary and environment funding score. There is weaker evidence for a positive Note: Dependent variable is natural log of research funding score. OLS regression estimated on four mutually exclusive samples of academic departments categorised by University Type. Sample of 'specialist' universities not included as it contains only 8 observations. See Appendix A for details of classifications of universities. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
relationship between average salary and impact funding score, which is consistent with the rules of the REF which are such that institutions cannot "buy-in" impact success. Note also that larger departments, those with more professors, especially those aged under 40, and those where pay inequality is higher do better in the environment component. The latter is perhaps evidence that attracting superstars is considered to improve the department's research environment.
The results also indicate some interesting differences in the role played by our controls. In particular, we find that having a member of staff sitting on the panel has a positive and statistically significant effect on the funding score obtained for research environment and impact. There is no significant effect instead on the output funding score. These results are consistent with the idea that panel membership might be more important for the elements of the REF evaluation that are arguably more subjective, rather than for those which are based on more objective criteria such as the reputation of the outlet where a scholarly work has been published, its impact factor or the number of citations received.
Finally, results in these regressions also indicate a strong relationship between the age profile of the academic department and performance in outputs funding score, but not for environment and impact funding score (though the coefficient on the proportion of under-40 professors is positive and weakly significant in the model for outputs funding score). (4) in Table 3 . Column (2) the funding score for the department output component, Column (3) environment component and Column (4) 
Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between pay and research performance in UK universities. The UK setting is interesting because universities can freely compete on the salaries they offer to senior academics, and have an objective measure of research performance, which universities have strong incentives to target, since it affects both government funding and international reputation. To frame our analysis, we have proposed a simple theoretical model in which academics are inputs into the production of research, and universities seek to maximise the weighted average of the research quality evaluations. The model predicts that research performance is increasing in the average level of salary in a department and in the inequality of pay measured by the standard deviation.
Our empirical results support the predictions of the model that spending more on recruitment is associated with better outcomes in the REF in all disciplines. This is true both in subjects areas which anecdotal evidence suggests to be more competitive, such as business and management, economics, engineering, and also in subjects where there appears to be far less cross-institution movement of staff and possibly less competition, (among them, arts and humanities). Inequality of pay is also associated with higher research performance, especially in the more research intensive institutions.
That universities respond to the REF rules by pursuing academics who will contribute to the measured research performance is suggested also by our analysis of the three components that make up the aggregate research score of the university. The positive salary-performance gradient is due mainly to the relationship between salary and scholarly publications: when an academic is head-hunted, this is the component of her recent record that can be transferred from one institution to another, whereas any "impact" that her research may have had contributes to the score of her previous institution.
Those whose task is to design the details of the evaluation process should also consider our consistent finding that, after controlling for other potential covariates, panel membership is associated with stronger performance, and this result in turn is driven by the effect of panel membership on the arguably more subjective "environment" and "impact" components of the evaluation.
As a final caveat, we should stress that our results should be interpreted with care. The data is a rich source of information on the characteristics of academic departments and their performance in the REF exercise, but our econometric analysis allows us to model only associations between characteristics and performance. We do not have natural experiments in our data, or other sources of identification which could be used to establish an indisputable causal link.
While individual UK academics will no doubt find these results of much interest, they warrant wider attention, as they contain important lessons on the effects of liberalising pay and introducing competition for resources in a largely publicly funded system. These lessons may be useful for other European countries, which are in the process of developing and strengthening a lively quasi-market system in the university sector. Note: Each observation corresponds to an individual university. Figure shows a scatter plot of total remuneration of university vice chancellors (x-axis, including pension contributions and discretionary payments) and log funding score (y-axis). The red fitted regression line is estimated on all observations; the blue fitted regression line is fitted on observations exlcuding the far-right outlier value.
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A Classification of UK Universities by Types
This appendix lists the members of the University 'Type' Groups used in the analysis (excluding therefore institutions with fewer than three professors, or which did not make a submission to the REF, and the London Business School). These groupings are based the membership of University associations during the relevant period. For each institution, we give in brackets the number of panels to which a submission was made, the fulltime equivalent number of staff submitted, and the fulltime equivalent number of full professors in post in October 2013.
Russell Group:
In 1994 a group of 17 'research intensive' UK universities formed an association known as the 'Russell Group', which grew to 20 Universities by 2006. In 2012 four additional universities joined from the newly-defunct '1994' group. Our classification of 'Russell Group' uses the 20 members from 2006 onwards on the basis that this group represents long-running core members.
